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ABSTRACT
Aiyagari (1992) demonstrates a connection between nonoptimal equilibria and pos
itively valued excess supplies (a failure of Wakas' Law) for a pure exchange overlapping
generations economy first studied by Samuelson (1958). We consider this connection in the
context of a more general framework [Tirole (1985)] that combines and extends the Samuelson
(1958) and Diamond (1965) frameworks by permitting both unsecured debt and production.
Positively valued excess supplies are shown to represent an economic opportunity that can
potentially be exploited by the issuance ofunsecured debt. When unsecured debt is issued,
Walras' Law does not fail in the sense described by Aiyagari. The key point, however, is
that the mere issuance of unsecured debt does not ensure Pareto efficiency. Rather, Pareto
efficiency is achieved if and only if the opportunity to issue unsecured debt is optimally
exploited, for example, by an earnings-driven private intermediary.
Key Words: Walras' Law, Pareto Efficiency, Intermediation, Overlapping Genera
tions.
*This paper encompasses and extends two previous working papers, Pingle and Tes
fatsion (1991b,1993). The authors are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for
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of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 (sl.tes@isumvs.ia^tate.edu).
1. Introduction
Aiyagari (1992) demonstrates a connection between the failure ofWalras' Law and
nonoptimal equilibria for a version of the pure-exchange overlapping generations (OG) econ
omy first studied by Samuelson (1958). The significant implication ofWalras' Law in finite
economies, given all prices are positive and all consumers are locally nonsatiated, is that
an excess supply (in value terms) cannot exist for some subset of goods without an excess
demand (in value terms) existing for some othersubset ofgoods. Aiyagari defines the failure
of Walras' Law as a situation in which this implication of Walras' Law does not hold. His
basic and interesting result is to show that "a competitive equilibrium is nonoptimal if and
only if the above impHcation of Walras' Law fails in its neighborhood."
Aiyagari (1992, Section2) clearly demonstrates that Walreis' Law fails for his OGeconomy
in the neighborhood of nonoptimal equilibrium points. But shouldn't we be skeptical of a
model in which positively valued excess suppHes can occur in equiUbrium? After all, where
do the excess suppHes go? Nonsatiated consumers would not simply throw the excesses away.
The objective of this paper is to show that the positively valued excess supplies which
Aiyagari connects with Pareto inefficiency represent an economic opportunity that can po
tentially be exploited through the issuance of unsecured debt. We demonstrate that, when
•unsecured debt is issued, Walras' Law does not fail in the sense described by Aiyagari. The
crucial point, however, is that unsecured debt issue is not enough to ensure Pareto effi
ciency in and of itself. Rather, Pareto efficiency is achieved if and only if the opportunity
to issue unsecured debt is optimally exploited, for example, by an earnings-driven private
intermediary.
For conceptual clarity, we begin in Section 2 by motivating our arguments in the context
of a simpHfied version of Aiyagari's pure-exchange OG economy. We then show in Section 3
that these same arguments hold for the OG economy studied by Tirole (1985), a framework
that generalizes Aiyagari's framework by permitting both production and a fixed quantity of
unsecured debt. In particular, we establish that Walras' Law holds for the Tirole economy
despite the fact that equilibria need not be Pareto efficient.
In Section 4 we introduce a private corporate intermediary into the Tirole Economy that
is freely able to issue unsecured debt and that distributes all of its net earnings back to
shareholders. Once again, Wakas' Law is shown to hold. In contrast to the Tirole Economy,
however, aU equiUbria for this modified "Brokered Economy" are Pareto efficient if the in
termediary maximizes its market value in each period of time. The transversality condition
associated with this maximum value objective is seen to be analogous to the Cass-Balasko-
Shell transversality condition elaborated in Balasko and Shell (1980), a condition they show
to be both necessary and sufficient for Pareto efficiency. Consequently, an interesting corol
lary of our findings is that this type of transversality condition can be interpreted as a
first-order condition for an optimization problem faced by an economic agent missing from
the standard OG model: namely, a private earnings-driven intermediary.
2. A Simple Example
2.1. An OG Economy With No Unsecured Deht Issue
Consider a pure exchange OG economy that begins in period 1 and extends into the
infinite future. One perishable consumable resource exists, which is distinguished in period
t cLs "good t." At the beginning of each period a single two-period lived "generation t
consumer" is born. The generation t consumer is endowed with > 0 units of good t
and > 0 units of good t H- 1. His preferences over consumption profiles (cj,cj+i) are
represented by a utility function C/"(cJ, that is twice continuously diiferentiable, strictly
quasi-concave, strictly increasing, and satisfies t/"(cj,0) = C^(0,Cf^i) = C/(0,0) and
(1) MRS(w\w'') = Ui{w\w^)/U2(w\w^) < 1.
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It is aJso assumed that consumer preferences satisfy gross substitutability.^
The population of the economy in period 1 consists of the young generation 1 consumer
and one old "generation 0 consumer." The generation 0 consumer hcis an endowment of
> 0, prefers more consumption to less, and dies at the end of period 1.
Intertemporal trades are facilitated by a price system p = {pi,p2^ ••O? where pt denotes
the price of good t in terms of a unit of account. Given this price system, the lifetime utility
maximization problem faced by each generation t consumer, f > 1, takes the form:
(2) max i7(cj,cj+i)
with respect to (cj,cj+i) subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
(3) Ptc] + pt+ic^t+i =
(4) c}>0,
Given the stated restrictions on consumer preferences, any solution to this utility maximiza
tion problem must satisfy
(5) = pt/pt+i .
Finally, the consumption level of the generation 0 consumer is given by
(6) picl = piw^.
Let c = (cj, (cj, Cj), (c^, (^),...) denote an allocation for the economy. A nonnegative
allocation c is feasible if and only if the market for good t clears in each period i > 1, in the
sense that
(7) + > cj + i > 1 .
Following Aiyagari (1992, Section 2.1), an equilibrium for the economy is an allocation c > 0
and a price system p > 0 that satisfy conditions (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7).
^In the model at hand, gross substitutability implies that an increase in the rate at which the generation
t consumer can trade good t for good t + 1 results in an increase in hisoptimal savings, <> 1.
If the market clearing conditions (7) were required to hold as equalities, then it is straight
forward to show that the unique equilibrium allocation for the economy would be the "au
tarkic" allocation in which each consumer directly consumes his endowment profile and the
price sequence p satisfies pifpt+x —MRS{w^ for each t > 1. However, because the
market clearing conditions (7) allow for excess supply, the autarkic allocation is not the only
equilibrium allocation for the economy. In fact, there are an infinite number of equilibrium
allocations. What is unique about the autarkic allocation is that it is the only equilib
rium allocation for which the value of excess supply is zero in every market. For all other
equilibrium allocations, at least on^ market has a positively valued excess supply.
To illustrate, consider only the stationary equilibria for which pt = {l/pY for some con
stant p satisfying MRS(vP-^v)^) < < 1,whidi implies that the (gross) rate ofreturn pt/pt+i
takes on the constant value p for all t > I. The constant rate of return impHes that each
generation t consumer consumes the same consumption profile (cj, (c^,c^). Moreover,
the lifetime budget constraint (3) reduces to pc^ + = pw^ + for each i > 1, implying
that
(8) + — — = [1 —/>] —c^] > 0.
Three cases will now be considered: p = MRS{w^p = I; and MRS{w^yW^) < p < 1.
These three cases correspond to the three lifetime budget constraints depicted in Figure 1.
—Insert Figure 1 About Here—
li p = MRS{w^,w'^), then for each <> 1, impying that the market
clearing conditions (7) hold as equalities for each t >2. Since pi > 0, it follows from (6) that
the generation 0 consumer consumes his endowment (i.e., cJ = hence market clearing
also holds as an equality for t = 1. Consequently, as noted above, no excess supply exists in
this autarkic equiHbrium.
If /9 = 1, then (cJjC^^i) equals the "golden rule" consumption profile (c^,c^) for each
t > 1, and condition (8) impHes that the market clearing conditions (7) holdas equahties for
each t>2. In period 1, the generation 0 consumer consumes his endowment (i.e., = w^),
while the generation 1 consumer consumes less than his endowment (i.e., c\ = c^). Thus,
there is an excess supply of good 1 in period 1 (i.e., -f + w^). Since pi > 0, this
excess supply is positively valued, meaning Walras' Law fails for this equilibrium.
If p = where MRS(w^jw'^ ) < ^ < 1, then (cj,cf+i) = (c^,c^) for each ^ > 1, where
< w^. Together with condition (8), this implies that an excess supply of good t exists in
each period t > 2. In period 1, the generation 0 old consumer consumes his endowment (i.e.,
= w^) while the generation 1 young consumer consumes less than his endowment (i.e.,
= c^). Thus, an excess supply of good 1 exists in period 1 (i.e., +w^). Since
> 0 for each t > 1, the excess supply present in each period t > 1 is positively valued,
meaning Walras' Law fails for this equilibrium.
More generally, considering all equilibria both stationary and nonstationary, it can be
shown that a positively valued excess supply exists in every equilibrium except the autar
kic equihbrium. The results presented here are nevertheless sufficient to demonstrate the
meaning of Aiyagari's assertion that Walras' Law fails for his OG model.
To obtain a clearer understanding of the failure of Walras' Law for the economy at hand,
sum the budget constraints of all consumers through any generation T > 1 to obtain
i=T
(9) 0 = pt[w^ c^] + pT+i[w^ - 4+1 •
Combining (7) and (9), one sees that a positively valued excess supply can exist in net terms
forgoodst < T ifandonly ifpr+i[i£;^—Cy+i] < 0. Thequantity —Cr
is the value which'the generation T young consumer transfers from period T to period T + l,
allowing consumption in period T + 1 to exceed the period T + 1 endowment.
In the present economy, trade is mediated by a price system. The precise form of the
intermediation process is not explicitly articulated. Suppose an intermediary is explicitly
introduced in the form of a central clearing house. The assets of the clearing house at the
end of any period T would then consist of any excess supplies held after the completion of
all trades over periods t <T. Offsetting these assets would be the liability ~ c^+i.
obtained from condition (9).
These observations raise two questions about the economy presented:
• Is the failure of Walras' Law fail due to the implicit existence of an asset—specifically, a
quantity of unsecured debt—that is not explicitly recognized in the structural equations
for the economy?
• Is the failure of Pareto efficiency due to the implicit existence of an earnings opportunity-
the opportunity to garner excess supplies through the issuance of unsecured debt—that
is not explicitly recognized, much less exploited, by agents in the economy?
In the next subsection, we argue that the answer to both of these questions is "yes."
Given the explicit introduction of a fixed quantity of unsecured debt in the initial period 1,
Walreis' Law (in Aiyagari's sense) no longer fails. Further, we show that Pareto efficiency
results only if the opportunity to issue unsecured debt is optimally exploited.
2.2 An OG Economy With Unsecured Debt Issue
Suppose the economy described in Section 2.1 is now modified by having the generation
0 old consumer issue unsecured debt in amount Dq in the initial period 1. Let this imsecured
debt be taken as the unit of account, so that the price pt denotes the number of units of
imsecured debt necessary to buy one unit of good i in period t. Under these assumptions,
the budget constraint of the generation 0 old consumer becomes
(10) cl =w' +^.
Pi
Consumers in generations t > \ are not allowed to issue debt, but they are allowed to
purdtiase old debt and then to resell it. Debt can also be sold short, allowing consumers
to borrow. No other intermediation options are available. Under these assumptions, the
lifetime utility maximization problem faced by the generation t consumer, t > 1, takes the
form:
(11) max ?7(cJ,c?+i)
with respect to (cj,A) subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
(12) cj = ^ ;
Jrt
Dt(13) „
Pt+1
(14) 4>0,
Let D = (Z^o) 5•• •) denote the sequence ofunsecured debt holdings for the economy.
An equilibrium for the economy is then a triplet (c, p, D) consisting of an allocation c > 0, a
price system p > 0, and a debt sequence D that satisfy conditions (5), (7), (10), (12), (13),
and (14), together with the following market clearing condition for the unsecured debt:
(15) > Dt for all t > 1 .
Recall that unsecured debt is issued only once, in period 1, hence the supply of unsecured
debt in each period t > 1 is given by the unsecured debt £)<_! held by generation t —1.
The young age and old age budget constraints (12) and (13) together generate the lifetime
budget constraint (3). Thus, there are only two essential differences between the economy
presented here and the economy presented in Section 2.1. First, the generation 0 consumer
can here receive a wealth windfall from the issuance of unsecured debt, whereas no such
windfallwas previously possible. Second, the medium of exchange is here expHcitly identified
as being unsecured debt, whereas the medium of exchange was not previously specified.
Although Walras' Law was shown to fail for the economy without unsecured debt, it
cannot fail for the present economy. To understand this, note that by combining the young
age budget constraint for generation t with the old agebudget constraint for generation t—1
one obtains
(16) 0 = Pi —cj — + Di-i —Dt 1 t > 1 .
Using condition (16), a positively valued excess supply of good t imphes an excess demand
for unsecured debt in period a violation of the market clearing condition (15). Thus, no
positively valued excess supply of any good t > 1 can exist in equihbrium, meaning Walras
Law does not fail in the sense of Aiyagari (1992).
To obtain a deeper understanding of the role played by Wakas' Law in the economy at
hand, sum the budget constraints of all consumers over generations t <T to obtain
t-T
(17) 0 = J2pt[w^-\-w^-c]-c^] + Do - •
i=l
Having shown above that pt[w^ + —cj ~ cf] = 0 and Dt = A-i must hold for each t > 1,
condition (17) implies Do = Dt = Pt+i[<^+i — The asset value Do obtained in period 1
by the institution offering the initial debt issue is thus exactly offset by an associated liability
Dt that is transferred forward into the infinite future. In particular, it is the ability to roll
over debt into the infinite future that permits the initial issuer of unsecured debt to obtain
a positive windfall return Do > 0- If the infinite time horizon were truncated at the end of
period T, the term pr+i[cy+i — would not appear in condition (17) and Do = ^ would
have to hold.
The restoration ofWalras' Law in (16) rules out some of the inefficient equilibria obtained
for the Section 2.1 economy. For example, because an excess supply is no longer possible in
equilibrium, none of the allocations for the Section 2.1 economy that were associated with
rates of return p satisfying MRS[w^^w'^ ) < p < \ can now be supported cls equilibria.
Nevertheless, Pareto efficiency is still not ensured. As is known from Gale (1973), Pareto
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efficiency for the present economy dependsupon the real valueof the period 1unsecureddebt.
If the period 1 price pi is such that the initial real debt level is given by Dojpi = [c^ —w\
then the economy has a unique stationary Pareto eifficient equihbrium allocation in which
each generation t consumer consumes thegolden rule consumption profile = (c\ c^),
the generation 0 consumer consumes cj = and the rate of return in each period i > 1
is given by p = 1. Alternatively, if pi = H-oo so that Dofpi = 0 (i.e., the unsecured debt
is worthless), then the only possible equilibrium allocation is the Pareto inefficient autarkic
allocation in which each consumer simply consumes his own endowment in each period t. If
0 < Do/pi < then a nonstationajy Pareto inefficient equiUbrium allocation results,
with the consumption profile of the generation t consumer converging to the endowment
profile as t becomes arbitrarily large. Finally, increasing the initial unsecured debt level
DqIpi above [c^ —w^] puts the economy on a path to economic collapse, for the real demand
for unsecured debt exceeds the total endowment of the economy in finite time.
In summary, this example illustrates that Walras' Law does not fail in the sense of
Aiyagari (1992) when a fixed quantity of unsecured debt is explicitly introduced into the
economy. Nevertheless, a Pareto efficient outcome is still not guaranteed. In Pingle and
Tesfatsion (1991a) it is shown that introducing a private intermediary with a suitable earnings
objective into the economy at hand can ensure a Pareto efficient outcome. In the next two
sections we show that this result is valid for a much broader class of OG economies.
3. A More General Argument: The Tirole Economy
To explore the connection between Walras' Law, Pareto efficiency, and intermediation
in a more general context, we next consider the OG economystudied by Tirole (1985). Aswill
be clarified, below, the latter economy encompasses both the pure-exchange consumption-
loan economy of Samuelson (1958) and the private production economy of Diamond (1965).
3.1 The Tirole Economy
The Tirole Economy is an OG model consisting of two-period lived agents, identical
aside from time of birth. The population grows at rate n > 0. The economy begins in
period 1 with Lo > 0 old consumers of generation 0 and Li = [I n]Lo young consumers
of generation 1. There is a single nonperishable resource which may either be consumed
or used in production as capital. As before, the resource available during period t will be
referred to as "good t"
Each young consumer in each generation i > 1 inelastically supplies one unit of labor in
return for a real (resource) wage Wt. Wage income is used by young consumers to provide
young-age consumption cj and savings st. Old-age consumption is provided entirely
from savings and accumulated interest; old consumers do not work. Consumer saving takes
two forms: investment in capital; and investment in a bubble asset which pays no dividends.
The bubble asset can be thought of as vouchers representing real purdiasing power—^for
example, real money balances or bonds. If capital and the bubble asset are both to be held
in competitive equilibrium, the bubble asset must bear the same yield as capital. Thus, it is
assumed that saving in either form has a common rate of return rt+i over each period t>l.
The objective of each generation t young consumer is to maximize his lifetime utility
C/(cJ,cJ^j), where U{') is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
quasi-concave, with = C/'(cJ,0) = C/'(0,0). Given any > 0 and > —1, the
utility maximization problem faced by this young consumer takes the form
(18) maxt/(c},c?+i)
with respect to (5t,cJ,c^^;i) subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
cj = -uji - ;
^i+i = [1 + ;
> 0, > 0 .
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The solution to this problem will hereafter be denoted by rt+i), r^+i), c^{wt^ ^t+i))
Each old consumer in the initial period 1 is assumed to be entitled to a principal-plus-
interest payment [1 +ri]5o5 where the savings level 5o satisfies Sq = s{wo^ri). The consump
tion of each old consumer in period 1 is therefore cj = [1 + ri]5(i£;o5 7'i)-
Output in the Tirole Economy is produced at the beginning of each period using capital
and labor inputs in accordance with a production relation Y = F(K,L). The production
function F(-) is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and to satisfy the following
properties: twice continuous differentiability and strict concavity over Fk > 0,
Fx, > 0, and Fkk < 0; continuity over and, for each i > 0, Fk{K,L) 0 3.s K +oo
and Fk{K^L) —*• H-oo as K —> 0. Letting k = KJL and y = Y/L^ the production relation
can be expressed in per-capita (i.e., per-worker) form as y = F{k^ 1) = f(k).
In each period t the producer must pay the rental rate on capital employed and the
wage rate wt to laborers employed. The price-taking producer selects nonnegative levels K
and L of capital and labor inputs to maximize profits, measured as [F{K^L) —ViK —w^L.
In order for a vector {KtyLt) of capital and labor inputs to maximize period t profits, it is
both necessary and sufficient that the capital-labor ratio kt = Kt/Lt satisfy
(19) n = nh) ;
(20) w, = f[h)-f'{h)kt.
In each period i the supply of capital consists of aggregate savings less
that part of savings held in the form of the bubble asset. Let = Lt-xht-i denote
aggregate bubble asset holdings and Ki denote the producer's aggregate demand for capital.
One then has the following definitional identity for the per capita bubble asset which
ensures "capital market clearing" holds for the Tirole Economy in period t\
(21) ht-i = - [1 + n]kt .
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Following Tirole (1985, p. 1503), the restriction = [1 + is imposed on the growth
of the aggregate bubble asset holdings Bt, or equivalently in per-capita terms,
(22) hi —[(1 + rt)/{l + n)]ht-\ .
The implications of restriction (22) are examined in Section 3.2, below.
Young consumers in eadi period t supply labor inelastically, in total amount Lt. Supply
equals demand in the labor market when the producer chooses to employ this labor supply.
Hereafter it is assumed that supply equals demand in the labor market in each period so
that Lt denotes the period t work force as well as the period t population of young consumers.
Since capital in the Tirole Economy does not depreciate, the total supply of product
available during each period t is Yt Kt. The total demand for product includes capital
demand for the following period, Kt+ii and aggregate consumption for the current period,
irtcj + In per capita terms, expess supply equals zero in the period t product market
when
(23) Zp{t) = yt+ kt-[l-\-n]kt+i-c]~c^/[l-\-n] = 0.
Finally, following Tirole (1985, p. 1505), the economy is initiaHzed by assuming that the
capital-labor ratio fco > 0 and the per capita bubble asset holdings 6o > 0 are historically
given. The capital-labor ratio ko in turn determines the initial interest rate Tq and the initial
wage rate wq in accordance with the marginal productivity conditions
(24)
(25)
ro = f'iko) ;
1^0 = f{ko) - f'{ko)ko
The Tirole Economy can then be reduced to a pair of difference equations in the state
variables kt and bt over times t > 1,
(26)
(27)
1 -f n]kt = s{fikt-i) - f'{kt-^)kt^^J'{kt)) - bt-i ;
h = ([1 + r{kt)]/[l -f- n]) bt-i ,
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starting from the exogenously determined initial values ko and Iq.
As in Tirole (1985), an equilibrium will now be defined for the Tirole Economy in terms
of optimality conditions for the consumers and the producer, the capital market clearing
condition, and the growth restriction on bubble asset holdings.^
DEFINITION 1: [Tirole Equilibrium Given initial values Icq > 0 and 6o ^ 0 for
capital and bubble asset holdings, a sequence cj, cj, fcj, 6^, r^, t > 1) of savings levels
Si, consumption levels c] and capital-labor ratios kt, per capita bubble asset levels bt,
interest rates rt > 0; and wage rates wt>0 is an equilibrium e{ko^ bo) for the per capita
Tirole Economy if and only if it satisfies the following four conditions:
• [Consumer Optimization] In each period t > 1, the young consumer's choice
vector (5^, cj, solves the lifetime utility maximization problem (18) conditional on
Wt and rt+i,' and each old consumer in period 1 consumes = [1 + ri]5o with 5o =
s(/(A;o) -
• [Producer Optimization] In each period t>\, the producer's capital-labor ratio
choice kt solves the necessary and sufficient conditions (19) and (20) for profit
maximization conditional upon Wt and rt.
Capital Market Clearing] In each period t> I, condition (21) holds.
Bubble Asset Growth Restriction] In each period t>l, per capita bubble asset
holdings grow in accordance with condition (22).
An equilibrium e(fco>^o) for the Tirole Economy will be ca//e<f stationary if kt = ko and
bt = bo for each period f > 1.
^Given consumer and producer optimization, and the capital market clearing condition (21), the bubble
asset growth restriction (22) holds ifand only if the product market clearing condition (23) holds; see Section
3.2, below.
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3.2 Walras' Law, Pareto Efficiency, and Intermediation
The Tirole Economydoes not include an expHcit intermediating institution. Nevertheless,
it is still possible to consider intermediation as a distinct function performed separately from
production. The production function is that of transforming the capital and labor inputs
into output. The intermediation function is that of obtaining savings for investment and
consumption loans, and of fulfilUng outstanding savings contract obligations. Hereafter we
use the term "intermediary" to describe the unit performing the intermediation function.
The Tirole Economy generalizes the private production OG model set out in Diamond
(1965) in one crucial respect: Diamond's market clearing condition for capital is relaxed
to allow for consumption loans, as in Samuelson (1958). Specifically, as depicted in Figure
2, the Diamond capital market clearing condition St = I^t+i is replaced by the condition
St =:Bf\- Kt+i' From the viewpoint of young consumers, Bt represents the portion of their
savings held in the form of a bubble asset, e.g., fiat money or bonds. From the viewpoint of
the intermediary, Bt represents the portion of his deposits not invested in capital.
—Insert Figure 2 About Here—
The Tirole intermediary in period t is obliged to make a principal-plus-interest payment
1 + to generation t —I old consumers . The intermediary also receives from the
producer a demand for capital, Kt+i- Incoming receipts consist of the savings deposits St
receivedfrom young consumers and the principal plus interest repayment [1 -{- rt]Kt received
from the producer for capital borrowed in period t —1. The net earnings of the intermediary
in period t are therefore given by
(28) Hi — iS"; + [1 + rt]Kt —[1 + T^St^x —Kt+1
= [St-Kt+i]-[l + rt][St-i~Kt]
= - [1 + rt]Bt-i .
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As depicted in Figure 2, the intermediary uses Bt to finance consumption loans. However,
the passive financing of consumption loans is not enough, in and of itself, to guarantee that
all equilibria are Pareto efficient. Given various regularity conditions on the form of the
savings function s(-) and the production function f{')? Tirole (1985) proves that the Tirole
Economy has two distinct stationary equihbria: a Pareto efficient "golden-rule" equilibrium
e" characterized by the biological interest rate n and positive bubble asset holdings; and
a Pareto inefficient equilibrium e characterized by an interest rate f < n and zero bubble
asset holdings. Moreover, given any initial capital-labor ratio ko > 0 and any suitably small
initial value bo>0 for bubble asset holdings, he establishes the existence of a unique Pareto
zTiefficient equilibrium e{ko,bo) that converges to e.
As for the simple illustrative economy in Section 2.2, however, Walras' Law cannot fail
(in the sense of Aiyagari) for the Tirole Economy, i.e., positively valued excess supplies
cannot exist in equilibrium. Combining the young age budget constraint for generation t,
the old age budget constraint for generation t —1, the first order conditions for firm profit
maximization, and the definitional identity (21), and using the notation Zp(t) introduced in
(23) for excess supply in the period t product market, one obtains the following analog to
(16) for the Tirole Economy:
(29) 0 =
= z^{t) +
Wt-C,-
' (1 + n)_
(1 + r,)
(l + n)
It is apparent from condition (29) that Walras' Lawholds for the Tirole Economy, given the
restriction (22) imposed on the bubble asset holdings bt.
Is there any good economic reasonfor the imposition of the Tirolerestriction (22)? What
happens, for example, if this restriction is weakened to an inequahty?
Given (22), the intermediary's net earnings (28) are forced to be zero in every period t.
statement of these regularity conditions is given in Section A.l of the Appendix.
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+
(1 + r,)
(l + n)
—ht
— St
In imposing condition (22), Tirole (1985, p. 1503) correctly notes that physical capital and
the bubble asset must earn the same yield in order for both assets to be held in equilibrium.
However, the equality of these yields does not, in and of itself, imply that condition (22)
must hold. Rather, condition (22) holds if and only if an additional special-case restriction
is invoked: namely, the quantity of the bubble asset remains in fixed supply.
To understand this, let 0f_i denote the quantity of the bubble asset supplied by the
intermediary in period i —1, and let pl_i denote the price of the bubble asset during period
t —l measured in units of good t —1. Because the bubble asset is used exclusively to finance
consumption loans, it foUows that Bt-i = For the bubble asset to be held at the
same time capital loans axe being made, the bubble asset must earn the same rate of return
as capital, meaning that PtlPt^i = [1 + n]- Consequently,
(30) !!( = Bi — 1 rt Bt-i
= - [1
= •
From (30) it is seen that weakening restriction (22) to bt < (H-rt)/(l+rz)]6i_i permits the
intermediary to retire debt by setting 0* < 0t_i. Given debt retirement, it follows from (29)
that an excess demand would be generated in the product market, hence the intermediary's
net earnings would be negative. This situation could not arise in equilibrium because the
intermediary would be unable to fulfiU all of its contractual obligations.
On the other hand, weakening restriction (22) to bt > [(1 + rt)/(l + n)]5(_i permits the
intermediary to issue new debt by setting 0^ > 0(_i. This new debt issue in turn permits
the intermediary to generate a positive excess supply in the product market and hence to
adiieve positive net earnings. As long as net earnings are nonnegative, the intermediary
can meet all of its outstanding contractual obligations; and a positive net earnings implies
in addition that the intermediary obtains a positive real profit: namely, the excess supply
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generated in the product market.
In short, there does not appear to be anycompelling economic argument for imposing the
Tirole restriction (22) a priori. The elimination of this restriction does mean that Walras'
Law fails in the sense of Aiyagari (1992). However, from an economic point of view, the
elimination simply permits the intermediary to achieve positive net earnings through new
debt issue. The difficulty is that the elimination raises new economic modelling issues. Who
consumes these positive net earnings? Also, given the possibility of positive net earnings, is
it still reasonable to suppose that the coordination of trade and credit transactions remains
the intermediary's sole objective? What happens, in particular, if the intermediary now
pursues an earnings objective? The next section takes up these questions.
4. An Illustrative Example of a Brokered Economy
In this section we first outline a generalization of the Tirole Economy, referred to as a
"Brokered Economy," which explicitly includes a private corporate intermediary that is freely
able to issue unsecured debt. We show that Walras' Law holds for the Brokered Economy
as long as the intermediary distributes all of its net earnings to its shareholders. We then
introduce a possible earnings objective for the intermediary under which all equilibria are
necessarily Pareto efficient.
4.1 The Basic Model
Suppose the Tirole Economy is now generalized to include a corporate intermediary
that provides two different assets for purchase by consumers: (1) shares of stock in the in
termediary; and (2) bonds. There are no risk differences between stock shares and bonds,
so that consumers base their asset choices only upon expected rates of return. Eadti young
consumer in generation t demands Ot shares of stock and At bonds, to be sold in the subse-
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quent period. The period t prices of stock shares and bonds in terms of good t are and
p^, and are taken as given by consumers.
The intermediary distributes all net earnings back to shareholders as dividends. Let
denote the dividend per share that each young consumer in generation t expects to receive
ia period t + 1. The utiHty maximization problem faced by a generation t young consumer
then takes the form
(31) maxC/(cJ,c?+i)
with respect to A<, cj, subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
c] ^Wt-p^Ot-piXt ;
^t+l ~ Pt+l^i Pt+l^i "f" 5
^ 0, > 0 .
No sign restrictions are placed on Ot or Af, implying that short sales are allowed for both
stock shares and bonds. Consequently, assuming all prices are positive, no finite solution
exists for problem (31) unless stock shares and bonds have a common rate of return, i.e.,
unless the following "viability condition" holds for some > —1:
(32) + = Pni/Pt = [1+^t+i •
Given positive prices and condition (32), there exist determinate optimal solution values
(s(ii;f,rt+i),c^(iyt,rt+i),c^(iyt,rf+i)) for the optimal savings level st = [cj —Wt] and con
sumption levels (cj,cj^i) as functions of the wage Wt ajid the common rate of return rt+i.
By construction, these optimal savings and consumption functions coincide with the optimal
savings and consumption functions derived for the Tirole Economy in Section 3.1. The con
sumer in the Brokered Economy is indifferent among all stock-bond holdings (^^jA^) which
support his optimal savings and consumption levels. Consequently, the specific values of
these demands are determined by a passive adjustment to available supplies.
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In the initial period 1, each old consumer owns a nonnegative number oi stock shares
and a nonnegative number Aq of bonds. Thus, the aggregate quantities of stock shares cind
bonds in existence in period 1 are 0o = Lo$o and Aq = LqXq. Each old consumer is entitled
to a period 1 dividend and also earns income in period 1 by selling the stock shares and bonds
owned. Thus, each old consumer in period 1 plans to consume cf = pl9o + PiAo + dl$o. It
will be assumed that this planned consumption derives from an (unmodelled) time 0 choice
problem of the form (31), and that a viability condition of the form (32) holds also for
t = 0. Consequently, the planned consumption of old agents in period 1 can equivalently be
expressed in the form cj = [1 + ri]5(if;o, ri), where Wq = /(fco) ~ /'(^o)^o is the wage received
by the old agent in youth.
The problem facing the producer in the Brokered Economy is identical to that facing
the producer in the Tirole Economy, except that all capital transactions are brokered by the
intermediary. An initial positive capital-labor ratio ko is assumed to be historically given.
In each period t > 1, the profit-maximizing producer has the opportunity to rent capital
from the intermediary to be used as an input to production along with the labor Lt supplied
inelastically by young consimiers. The rental capital Kt which the producer plans to employ
during period t is obtained from the intermediary during period t —I. As in Tirole (1985),
it will be assumed that the rate of interest charged to the producer for the rental of this
capital is the same as the rate of return on savings. Consequently, the producer plans to
pay the intermediary a principal-plus-interest payment [1 + rt\Kt during period t.
The intermediary's period t net earnings 11^ are equal to the quantity of good t remaining
in the intermediary's possession after all contractual obligations are fulfilled. These net
earnings are determined by a consideration of the intermediary's stock, bond, and capital
transactions.
Let 0t = LtOt and At = denote the total amounts of stock shares and bonds which
the intermediary plans to supply to consumers in period t. As a result ofstock share sales and
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purchases, the intermediary in period t plans to receive units of good from generation
t young consumers and to deliver units of good t to generation t —1 old consumers.
Moreover, as a result of bond sales and purchases, the intermediary in period t plans to
receive Pt^t units of good from generation t young consumers and to deHver units of
good t to generation t—1old consumers. Finally, as a result ofcapital rental transactions, the
intermediary in period t plans to receive a principal-plus-interest payment [l-^ri]Kt from the
producer and deliver capital Kt+i to the producer to be employed in the subsequent period
<4-1. Consequently, the intermediary's planned period t net earnings take the form
(33) —Pti^t ~~ ^t-i] + Ptl^t ~ Af_i] —[Kt+1 —(1 + > 1 .
In the Tirole Economy, only one asset—the "bubble asset"—is used to finajace consump
tion loans. As presented to this point, either stocks or bonds could be used by the Brokered
Economy intermediary to finance consumption loans. To achieve a more direct comparison
with the Tirole Economy, it will be assumed that the Brokered Economy intermediary fi
nances its consumption loans Bt solely by means of stock transactions and its capital loans
Kt solely by means of bond transactions; i.e..
(34) Bt-i = and Kt = , t> I .
Thus, stock shares play the role of Tirole's bubble asset in the Brokered Economy.
Given the viabiHty condition (32) and the financing restriction (34), the intermediary's
planned period t net earnings (33) can be expressed as
(35) n. =
= —[1 + , i > 1 .
By assumption, the intermediary distributes its period t net earnings n< as dividends to
generation t~l old shareholders. Thus Ilf = where dt denotes the per share dividend
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paid. It follows from (35) that Tirole's bubble asset growth restriction (22) holds ex post
for the Brokered Economy if young consumers correctly anticipate their per share dividend
and all of the intermediary's planned stock, bond, and capital transactions are realized.
Note, however, that Tirole's restriction is not an ex ante restriction on the intermediary's
behavior. Moreover, in the Brokered Economy, Tirole's restriction does not imply that the
intermediary's net earnings are zero. Rather, assuming positive prices, it follows from (35)
that the net earnings of the intermediary are zero if and only if the quantity of the bubble
asset remains constant over time.
Finally, as in the Tirole Economy, the capital market clearing condition for the Brokered
Economy holds as a definitional identity, given by relation (21), and the product market
clearing condition for the Brokered Economy again takes the form (23). On the other hand,
Tirole's restriction (22) is now eliminated, thus permitting the intermediary to issue addi
tional shares of stock. In particular, the supply of stock shares Of issued by the intermediary
to young consumers in period t is not constrained to equal the number of shares ©<_! that the
intermediary issued to generation <—1 shareholders. Rather, Ot will instead be determined
by a subsequent behavioral specification of an earnings objective for the intermediary.
4-2 Walras' Law and Pareto Inefficiency
Walras' Law can be investigated for the Brokered Economy by combining the budget
constraints of all consumers in period t. Using = wt Ttkt from producer optimization
and constant returns to scale, together with the viability condition (32) and the financing
restriction (34), one obtains
(36) 0 = z.p{t) + [df —dt]9t-i ,
where Zp{t) is defined as in (23) to be the real value of excess supply in the product market.
Thus, given fulfilled expectations, it is clear that Walras' Law holds for the Brokered Econ
omy in the sense of Aiyagari (1992). [Compare (36) with the form (29) for Walras' Law in
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the Tirole Economy.
The Brokered Economy is not yet complete, since rules of behavior for the intermediary
still need to be specified. In standard OG economies, intermediary behavior and market
clearing conditions have traditionally been equated; the intermediary is assumed to be a
passive Walrasian Auctioneer that sets prices and interest rates with the sole objective of
coordinating supply and demand in each market. As shown in Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991b,
section 5.A), the Brokered Economy essentially reduces to the Tirole Economy if the inter
mediary behaves as a passive Walrasian Auctioneer, and, as seen in Section 3.2, equihbria
for the Tirole Economy need not be Pareto efficient.
As will now be clarified, however, the alternative specification of an intermediary that is
motivated by earnings rather than by coordination has immediate and dramatic implications
for the efficient operation of the economy.
J^.S Pareto Efficiency with Active Earnings-Driven Intermediation
Suppose the intermediary is an- earnings-driven price-taking corporation that is able
to issue new shares of stock in each period t>\. An immediate and important implica
tion of this behavioral specification is that the Pareto inefficient allocation associated with
the bubbleless Tirole stationary equilibrium e cannot be supported as an equilibrium for
the Brokered Economy under any reasonable specification for the intermediary's earnings
objective. The equilibrium e is characterized by the stationary rate of return r < n and
zero net earnings in each period t. In this equiHbrium the intermediary does not finance
any consumption loans. However, given r, the intermediary in the Brokered Economy would
perceive the possibility of increasing his net earnings lit in each period t by financing a
positive amount of consumption loans.
To see this, suppose the price-taking intermediary decides to sell an additional fixed real
amount of stock Au = p^AOt to each young consumer in each generation t at the given rate
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of return r, where all receipts from these stock sales are to be used to finance consumption
loans. In the initial period 1, the intermediary would then expect to obtain the positive net
earnings increment iiAu, for the liability incurred by the additional stock sale does not come
due until the following period. Moreover, in every subsequent period i > 2 the intermediary
would expect to obtain the net earnings increment Z/^A-u —[1 H- r]Lt-iAv, or [n—rJI-f-iAu,
which is positive since n > f. Thus, the intermediary's anticipated net earnings under this
alternative course of action would be higher in each period t.
In short, under any reasonable specification of an earnings objective, the intermediary
in the Brokered Economy would desire to sell more stock shares at r than consumers would
desire to purchase. It follows that r cannot be a stationary equilibrium rate of return for
the Brokered Economy.
We will now formulate a possible earnings objective for the intermediary under which
aU equilibria are Pareto efficient. As a preliminary step in formulating this objective, we
first define an "intermediation plan" for the intermediary. Attention is restricted to plans
conditioned on price and interest rate sequences satisfying the viabiUty condition (32). The
intermediary's behavior in the face of nonviable price and interest rate sequences is irrelevant,
since such sequences never occur in equilibrium.
Given any viable sequence stock share prices and any historically
given 6o ^ .0? it follows from (35) that the intermediary's period t per capita net earnings
TTt = Ilf/Zrf can be expressed as a function
(37) 7ri(b;p^6o) = !>( - [p?/(H-
ofthe sequence b = (&i, &25 •••) ofits per capitabubble asset investments (consumption loans).
The sequence b will be called the intermediary's intermediation plan.
What constitutes a "feasible" intermediation plan b? The intermediary must fulfill all
contractual obligations. For aU contractual obligations to be fulfilled, the intermediary must
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receive enough good in each period to meet all outstanding obligations. This implies that
the intermediary must choose b such that 7rt(b; p^,Z>o) > 0 holds for all t>l.
In the absence of any additional constraint on its intermediation plans, however, the
intermediary would incorrectly perceive the possibility of obtaining arbitrarily large net
earnings in each period t by rolUng over ever-larger amounts of debt. Rationally perceived
quantity constraints ("no-Ponzi-game" conditions) are commonly used in overlapping gen
erations contexts to prevent price-taking altruistic consumers with bequest motives from
choosing nonfeasible "optimal" paths with exploding debt; see, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer
(1989, pp. 49-50). A similar type of constraint is needed in the Brokered Economy.
Specifically, we assume that the intermediary restricts his choice of an intermediation
plan to the set B of per capita bubble asset sequences b which do not diverge to infinity.
As established in Section A.2 of the Appendix, this assumption is rather innocuous; for the
intermediary can recognize a priori that a per capita bubble asset sequence b which diverges
to infinity could never be actualized in any equilibrium for the Brokered Economy.
In summary, given and 6o ^ 0, the set F(p^, 6o) of feasible intermediation plans b
is defined to be the collection of all nondivergent intermediation plans yielding nonnegative
net earnings in each period i > 1. Formally,
(38) F(p^ bo) = {b e B : 7r,(b; p«, 60) > 0 for all i > 1}.
The intermediary has considerable flexibility in distributing net earnings over time. How
ever, each shareholder cares only about the net earnings distributed during his lifetime. How
is the distribution of net earnings to be determined?
Here we consider one illustrative example of a dividend distribution objective for the
intermediary that takes into account the varied interests of all its shareholders. Specifically,
we assume that the intermediary seeks to maximize the minimum per capita dividend dis
tributed to shareholders over time. As shown below (Corollary 1), this dividend distribution
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objective implies that the market value of the corporate intermediary in any equilibrium
attains its maximum feasible value in each period t. Formally, the dividend distribution
objective of the intermediary takes the form
(39) max inf7rf(b;p^,6o).
^ ^ b6F(p^6o)^>l ^ ' 0''
The (possibly empty) solution set for problem (39) will be denoted by ^(p®,6o)-
A definition of equilibrium will now be given for the Brokered Economy that includes the
dividend objective of the intermediary as well as the utility objectives of consumers and the
profit objectives of producers.
DEFINITION 4.1. [Brokered Economy Equilibrium Let initial values > 0
^ 0 for per capita capital, per capita bubble asset, per capita stock shares, and
per capita bonds he given. A sequence (vt^dl^kt^Tntipt : ^ > 1) consisting of consumer
choice vectors vt = expectedper share dividends d^, producer per capita capital
demands kt, intermediary choice vectors mt = (Ot,Xt,ht), o-nd price-interest rate vectorspt
= > 0 is a Brokered Economy equilibrium e(fco, &o, ^oj-^o) if the
following six conditions are met:
• [Consumer Optimization] In each period i > 1, 5^ = 5(r4,ti;t+i)^ cj = c^{wt,ri^i),
and = c'^(rt,wt+i), and the consumption cf of each generation 0 old consumer in
period 1 satisfies cj = [1 + ri]s{f(ko) —f'{ko)ko,ri).
Producer Optimization] In each period t > 1, the producer's per capita capital
demand k^ solves (24) and (25), the necessary and sufficient conditions for profit
maximization conditional on Wt and rt.
Intermediary Optimization] The intermediary chooses a feasible intermediation
plan b which maximizes the minimum per capita dividend distributed over time, given
and &o; i'G', b GB(p^, 6o)-
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Market Clearing] In each period t > 1, the capital and product market clearing
conditions (21) and (23) are satisfied.
• [Fulfilled Expectations] In each period t >1, the expected per share dividend d^
coincides with the actual per share dividend.
• [Financing Restriction] Condition ($4) holds for allt>l in per capita terms.
A Brokered Economy equilibrium Q{ko,ho,9o, Xq) will be called stationary ifkt = k^ and
bf. = ho for allt>l.
It will now be shown, in a series of steps, that every equilibrium for the Brokered Economy
is Pareto efficient. Proofs of theorems are relegated to Section A.3 of the Appendix.
The price conditions appearing in Theorem 1, below, are the Brokered Economy analog of
the well-known Cass-Balasko-Shell transversality condition which Balasko and Shell (1980,
Proposition 5.6, pp. 296-297) have shownto be necessary and sufficient for Pareto efficiency in
the context of a pure-exchange OG economy. Balasko and Shell do not provide an economic
interpretation for their transversality condition. An interesting impHcation of Theorem 1
is that this type of transversality condition can be economically motivated as a first order
condition for an optimization problem faced by a previously unmodelled economic agent:
namely, a private intermediary.
THEOREM 1: Given any positive price sequence and any initial per capita bubble as
set level bo > 0, the solution set B{p^,bo) for the intermediary's optimization problem
(39) is nonempty if and only if the sequence (St) diverges to infinity and the sequence
'' •5i]^o) <^oes not diverge to infinity, where
(40) g, = +n)P(-i , <>
and
("^1) St = 1 qt + qtqt-i + ... + [qtQt-i *'' ^2] j ^^ 2,
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with = 1.
The next theorem establishes that the Pareto efficient golden-rule equilibrium for the
Tirole Economy is the unique real outcome possible for the Brokered Economy in any sta
tionary equilibrium. In particular, the Pareto inefficient stationary equihbrium e for the
Tirole Economy is not supported as a stationary equilibrium for the Brokered Economy.
THEOREM 2: There exists at least one stationary equilibrium for the Brokered Economy.
Every stationary equilibrium generates the same real outcome 6, r, where s
= [c^ —w]; namely, the Pareto efficient real outcome 6") constituting the golden-rule
equilibrium for the Tirole Economy. In particular, the unique stationary equilibrium interest
rate r for the Brokered Economy is given by r = n.
As estabhshed by Tirole (1985), all Pareto inefficient equilibria for the Tirole Economy
converge to the Pareto inefficient stationary equilibrium e. Consequently, one might surmise
from Theorem 2, which eliminates e as a possible Brokered Economy equilibrium, that all
equihbria for the Brokered Economy are Pareto efficient. The next theorem shows that this
is indeed the case.
THEOREM S: Every Brokered Economy equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
The following corollary establishes that the max-min dividend objective of the interme
diary is consistent with the goal of market value maximization.
COROLLARY 1: Given any equilibrium for the Brokered Economy, the market value Bt =
PtQt of the corporate intermediary is positive and takes on its maximum feasible value in
each period t > 1.
The final corollary establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
bubble on the stock shares issued by the intermediary.
COROLLARY 2: Given any equilibrium for the Brokered Economy, the stock share price p^
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in each period i > 0 equals its fundamental value—i.e., the present value of the current and
future per share stock dividends {dj : r > t)—if and only if the sequence ([^r^r-i *•*?i]^o)
converges to zero as T oo, where qj is defined as in (40).
In summary, the inefficiency observed in the Tirole Economy is completely eliminated if
an active corporate intermediary is introduced into the economy with an earnings objective
consistent with market value maximization. These findings suggest that the inefficiency ex
hibited by standardly modelled OG economiesmight well be ameliorated, or even eliminated
entirely, if intermediation were more realistically modelled as a private activity directed to
wards the exploitation of earnings opportunities rather-than as a passive coordination of
demand and supply.
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Appendix
A.l Regularity Conditions Imposed by Tirole (1985)
The Brokered Economy is a generalization of the Tirole Economy developed in Tirole
(1985). The regularity conditions imposed by Tirole are assumed to hold as well for the
Brokered Economy unless otherwise indicated. Several technical regularity conditions im
posed by Tirole and retained for the Brokered Economy were omitted from Section 3 for
expositional clarity; these conditions are hsted below.
Conditions (19) and (20) generate the well-known "factor-price frontier" relationship
between the wage rate Wt and the interest rate r^. For any given interest rate > 0, let
k(rt) denote the capital-labor ratio kt which uniquely satisfies condition (19). Substituting
k{rt) into condition (20), the wage rate wt which satisfies condition (20) is then uniquely
determined as a strictly decreasingfunction w{rt) of r^. As in Diamond (1965), Tirole (1985)
assumes that there exists a unique r satisfying 5(iy(r),r) = [1 -|-7i]^(r), with r < n.
As in Diamond (1965, eq.(ll), p. 1133), Tirole (1985) places a restriction on the relative
slopes of the capital market supply and demand curves along any competitive equilibrium
path. In particular, for the unique stationary equilibrium e = e(A:(f),0) associated with r,
this condition reduces to
(42) [f"{k{r))syj{w{r), r)]/[l -f n - f"{k{r))sr{w{r), r)] < 0 .
Moreover, as in Diamond (1965, footnote 1), Tirole assumes that consumption is a normal
good in each period of life for each agent, which implies 0 < s«, < 1. The numerator in con
dition (42) is therefore negative. Thus, in order for condition (42) to hold, the denominator
must be positive; i.e.,
(43) f"{k{r))sr(w{r)^ r)] > 0 .
Diamond (1965) also assumes that e is locally stable, and hegives a condition (eq.(12),
p. 1134) which is necessary for this to be the case; namely,
(44) I [-K^)/"(^(^))5w(tf^(?^),r)]/[H-n-/"(fc(r))5,.(u;(r),f)] I< 1.
A sufficient condition for the local stability of e is that condition (44) hold with strict
inequality, a condition assumed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) in his extension of the Diamond
framework.
A.2 Proofthat Equilibrium Intermediation Plans Cannot Diverge
Suppose b isanequilibrium intermediation plan for the Brokered Economy which diverges
to infinity. Since thehistorically given value bo is nonnegative by assumption, it follows from
the form (35) for the intermediary's net earnings, and the necessity to have these net earnings
nonnegative in every period to fulfill all contracts, that the sequence b is nonnegative.
Consequently, using the capital market clearing condition, the nonnegative elements bt =
St—(1 + n)kt+i\ of the sequence b must become infinitely large as t approaches infinity.
The savings St of a representative generation i young agent must be nonnegative and
less than his endowment in order for the agent to consume a nonnegative amount of
good when young and when old. Moreover, since the interest rate along any equilibrium
path is positive by assumption, it follows from the producer optimization condition (19)
that the capital-labor ratio kt along any equilibrium path must also be positive. Using these
observations, together with the producer optimization condition (20), one obtains
(45) 0 < St/kt < wtjkt = f{kt)lkt —f{kt) < f(kt)lkt for all i > 1 .
Since the capital-labor ratio kt is positivealong any equilibriumpath, ht can only become
infinitely large if St and thus wt both become infinitely large. By conditions (19) and (20),
and the production function restrictions given in Section 3.1,for Wt to become infinitely large
as t approaches infinity, the interest rate must approach zero and the capital-labor ratio
ktmust become infinitely large as t approaches infinity. Consequently, by strict concavity of
the production function /(•), and the assumption that f'(k) approadies zero as k approaches
infinity, the right-hand average product ofcapital in (45) must approach zero as t approaches
infinity, implying that the ratio St/kt does also.
Finally, consider the expression
(46) St-i/kt-i —[1 + n]kt/kt-i = bt-i/kt-i > 0 .
Since st~i/kt^i approaches zero a-s t approaches infinity, the (positive) term [1 -\-n]kt/kt^i
must also approach zero as t approaches infinity in order to have the right term remain
nonnegative for all t. Consequently, kt < kt^i for all sufficiently large t. But this contradicts
the fact, established above, that kt becomes infinitely large as t approaches infinity.
It follows that no equihbrium intermediation plan b for theBrokered Economy can diverge
to infinity. •
A.3 Proofs for Section 4 Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1: Necessity. Suppose {St) does not diverge to infinity. Let •qi]bo
for each i > 1, where 6o ^ 0 denotes initial per capita bubble asset holdings; and consider
the intermediation plan b defined by
(4'^ ) bt = M qtht-i = StM-h Qt j t > 1 ^
where Mis an arbitrary positive constant. Since ?( > 0 for each t > 1, 0 < for
each t > 1. It then follows from (47) that 0< < St[M+5i&o] for each t > 1. Consequently,
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the nondivergence of (5t) implies that b lies in the set B of nondivergent sequences. Finally,
it follows from (47) and (35) that the intermediary's per capita net earnings tt^ satisfy ttj =
M for each t > 1. Since M can be chosen arbitrarily large, this implies that the solution set
for the intermediary's optimization problem (39) is empty.
Thus, the solution set for the the intermediary's optimization problem (39) is nonempty
only if (St) diverges to infinity.
By assumption, bo > 0. Given any feasible intermediation plan b, it follows by (35) and
the definition of feasibility that = 6^ —qth-i > 0 for each t > 1. Thus, ht > Qt for
each t > 1. If the nonnegative sequence {Qt) were to diverge to infinity, b would diverge to
infinity and hence be infeasible, a contradiction. Consequently, the set F(p^, 6o) of feasible
intermediation plans is nonempty only if (Qt) does not diverge to infinity.
It follows that the solutionset for the intermediary's optimization problem (39)—a subset
of F(p^, 6o) by construction—is nonempty only if {Qt) does not diverge to infinity.D
Proofof Theorem 1: Sufficiency. Suppose {St) diverges to infinity but (Qt) does not diverge
to infinity. Let M denote the largest level ofper capita net earnings which the intermediary
can achieve in each period t > 1 by means of some feasible intermediation plan b. Using
(35), this means that b must satisfy irt = bt —qtbt-i > M for alH > 1, or
(48) bt > StM-\-Qt , i >1 .
Since the nonnegative sequence {St) diverges to infinity, and Qt is nonnegative for all i > 1,
b Hes in the set B ofnondivergent sequences only ifM < 0. Thus, the max-min level of per
capita net earnings which the intermediary can feasibly achieve is at most 0.
To establish that the solution set for the intermediary's optimization problem (39) is
nonempty, it thus suffices to show that there exists a feasible intermediation plan which
yields zero per capita net earnings in each period ;( > 1. Since {Qt) does not diverge to
infinity, such an intermediation plan is found by taking bt = qtbt~i for all t > 1. •
Lemma 1. If the sequence {St) diverges to infinity, the max-min level of per capita net
earnings whidi the intermediary can feasibly achieve is zero.
Proof ofLemma 1. As^ established in the proof of sufficiency for Theorem 1, the divergence
of {St) implies that M = 0 is the maximum level of per capita net earnings which the
intermediary can feasibly achieve in each period ^ > 1. •.
Lemma 2. Any equilibrium sequence {st,c\,c^tih,ht,rt,wtd > 1) of real outcomes for a
Brokered Economy with initial conditions of the form ko > 0 and (60,^0,^0) > 0 is an
equilibrium for a Tirole Economy with initial conditions of the form ko > 0 and 60 > 0,
where st = [cj —Wt] for the Brokered Economy.
Proof ofLemma 2. Let fco > 0 and (ftoj^ojAo) > 0 be given initial conditions for a Brokered
Economy. Consider the general definition for a Brokered Economy equilibrium presented in
Section 3.1. Using the various conditions listed in this definition, particularly the capital
market clearing and fulfilled expectations conditions, it is straightforward to show that any
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Brokered Economy equilibrium paths for kt and bt must satisfy the two basic state equations
(26) and (27) for the Tirole Economy; hence they must also be equilibrium paths for the
Tirole Economy.
Given the viability condition (32) on interest rates and prices, a necessary condition for
the existence of a Brokered Economy equilibrium, the Brokered Economy equilibrium con
ditions for consumer and producer optimization reduce to the conditions for consumer and
producer optimization appearing in the definition of a Tirole equilibrium. Consequently,
given any paths for kt and ht which are equilibrium paths for both the Brokered Econ
omy and the Tirole Economy, the equilibrium paths uniquely generated for the variables
{siyc]^c^,rt,Wt) by means of these consumer and producer optimization conditions will be
the same. •
Lemma 3. In order to have a stationary Brokered Economy equilibrium, it is necessary that
rt = n for each t >1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose ©(fco? &O5 '^ o) is a stationary Brokered Economy equiHbrium.
By definition of stationarity, kt = fco for all t > 0. Producer optimization then imphes
that rt = f'iko) for all t > 1. Let r = f'{ko). It then follows froiii the viabiUty condition
appearing in the definition for a Brokered Economy equilibrium that any sequence of stock
share prices in a stationary equilibrium must satisfy
(49) qt = pf/(l + n)Pi^_i = a- [z^/{l + ?x)] , t > 1 ,
where z® = dt/pt_i denotes the period t price-normahzed expected per share dividend, and
a = [1 -1- r]/[l -i- 7z] > 0.
By assumption, the equilibrium stock share price Pt_i is positive for all t > 1. Moreover,
since equilibrium per capita net earnings ttj must be nonnegative in each period < > 1, it
follows by fulfilled expectations that the equilibrium expected per share dividend must
be nonnegative for each i > 1. Thus, > 0 for all t > 1, implying that qt < a for all t>l.
By Theorem 1, the sequence (^t) defined as in (41) must diverge to infinity in order for a
solution for the intermediary's problem to exist, and hence in order for a Brokered Economy
equilibrium to exist. Since qt < a for all i > 1, the divergence of (St) implies the divergence
of (St)y where
(50) = (2* t ^ 1.
However, the sequence (St) diverges only if a > 1. Thus, r >n must hold.
Next, suppose a > 1, or that r > n. In any Brokered Economy equilibrium, the actual
per share dividend dt in each period t must equal the expected per share dividend cZ®. Hence,
since all net earnings are distributed as dividends to old agents in each period t, TTf =
+ n)] for aU i > 1. It follows from (35) and the definition of a that 0 = —abt~i
for aU t > 1. But a > 1 then implies that bt diverges to infinity (and hence is infeasible)
unless bt = 0. Given a > 1 and bt = 0, it follows from the capital market clearing condition
and producer optimization that there exists an r > n satisfying s{w(r)^r) = [1 + n]jfc(r).
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a violation of a basic Tirole regularity condition retained for the Brokered Economy (see
Section A.l). Thus, r = n must hold. •
Proof of Theorem 2. ks established by Tirole (1985), the Tirole Economy has a unique
equilibrium associated with the stationary interest rate rj = n: namely, the golden-rule
equilibrium e" = e(^",fe") with fc" = A:(n) and 6" = 5(i{;(R),n) —[1 +n]^(n). (Although the
nonnegativity of 6^ is not established byTirole, it is shown in Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991a,
Appendix A) that 6" is actually strictly positive given the regularity conditions imposed by
Tirole as outlined in Section A.l above). Consequently, it follows from Lemmas 2 and 3
that the real outcome associated with any stationary Brokered Economy equihbrium must
coincide with this golden-rule equilibrium.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the Brokered Economy has a stationary
equilibrium with real outcome given by e".
Suppose, then, that the real outcome (5^, cj, cj, kt^ bt, rt^ wt) for the Brokered Economy is
given by the stationary golden-rule outcome e" in each period t > 1. Thus, in particular,
= n, kt = fc", and ht = 6" for each t > I. Suppose in addition that the expected per
share dividend satisfies = 0 for each t > 1. Let arbitrary initial stock and bond levels
00 > 0 and Aq > 0 be given. Using the financing condition appearing in the definition for a
Brokered Economy equilibrium, determine initial price levels for stock shares and bonds by
= 6"/0o a.nd Pq = 1 + njk^/Xo.
Given the stationary (positive) golden-ruleoutcomes k^ and 6", together with the positive
initial price levels Pq and Pq, determine values for the stock price pf, bond price p^, stock
level Sty and bond level A{ in each period i > 1 by the following four auxiliary relations
derived from the viability and financing conditions, together with the assumptions = n
and = 0:
(51) Pt =
pi =
Ot =
Xt =
1 + ^]pt-i;
i + "]pti;
hVpt;
1+ n\k'^ /pi
By construction, the sequences described above satisfy edl of the defining conditions for
a stationary Brokered Economy equilibrium with the possible exceptions of intermediary
optimization and fulfilled dividend expectations. To finish the proof, it remains to show
that the stationary intermediation plan bt = b^ lies in the solution set for the intermediary's
optimization problem (39); and, making use of this plan, the per share dividend expectations
= 0 are fulfilled.
Condition (51) implies that = pj/(l + ^)Pt_i is identically equal to 1. Thus, the
sequence {St) defined as in (41) diverges to infinity. Divergence of {St) implies, by Lemma
1, that the max-min level of per capita net earnings 7r< which the intermediary can feasibly
achieve is zero. Consequently, the solution set for the intermediary's optimization problem
(39) consists of all feasible intermediation plans since, by definition, each such plan must
yield at least zero per capita net earnings in each period £> 1. The stationary intermediation
plan bt = 6*^ is therefore an element of this solution set; for it is clearly a nondivergent plan,
and it yields tt^ = [1 —^ f]6" = 0 in each period £> 1. Finally, since the intermediary making
use of the plan bt = 6" has zero net earnings in eacti period £ > 1, he distributes zero per
share dividends in each period £ > 1, implying that the per share dividend expectations
= 0 are fulfilled. •
Proof of ThcoTem. 3. Suppose v* = {Ki K • ^ > 1) is a sequence of values for kt and bi
corresponding to a Pareto inefficient equilibrium for the Brokered Economy. As seen in the
proof of Theorem 2, v" must solve the Tirole state equations (26) and (27).
As established by Tirole (1985, Propositions 1 and 2, pp. 1504 and 1507). the solutions
to the state equations (26) and (27) can be partitioned into two subsets: the Pareto efficient
solutions which converge to the golden-rule equilibrium state vector (^",6"^); and the Pareto
inefficient solutions which converge to the bubbleless state vector (^,0). It follows from
Tirole's results that the Pareto inefficient solution v* must converge to (fc,0), hence the
interest rate r" associated with v"' must converge to f = f\k).
An assumption made by both Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), and maintained through
out the current paper, is that r < n. Consequently, rj" r implies that there exists some
T > 2 and some e > 0 such that r* < r* = n —c for all i >T. Let Uj = [1 -1- r*]/[l -|- ti] and
u = [1 + r"]/!! + n .
Making use of the viability condition appearing in the definition for a Brokered Economy
equihbrium, and the nonnegativity of equilibrium per share dividend expectations, it follows
as in (49) that the (positive) stock share prices p® along the equilibrium path v* must satisfy
(52) qt = pU{^-^^)pLi < Ut < u < I
for all t>T. But the relation (52) implies that (5t) defined as in (41) is a bounded sequence.
Specifically, for each £ > T + 2, the nonnegative sequence term St is bounded above by
(53) 5* = 1 -f U+ + . . . + U'" -f U^[T - \]Cmax,
where r = t —T, and Cmax denotes the largest of the T—1 products Cs, 5 = 2, •••T, defined by
Cg = [qr " ' 9s]- Since u'" —> 0 as r —^ +00, the sequence (5*) converges to 1/[1 —u]. It then
follows from Theorem 1 that the solution set B(p^^bo) for the intermediary's optimization
problem (39) is empty, which contradicts the assumption that v* is a Brokered Economy
equilibrium.
It follows that all Brokered Economy equilibria must be Pareto efficient. •
Proof of Corollary 1. Tirole (1985, p. 1504) establishes for the Tirole Economy that, given
any capital-labor ratio > 0, there exists a maximum feasible positive value b^ = b^{k) for
per capita bubble asset holdings consistent with equilibrium. Starting with {k,b"^) as initial
conditions in any period r > 1, the unique solution to the stationary state equations (26)
and (27) is a Pareto efficient Tirole equilibrium path for (fc{,6t) over periods £ > r which
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converges to the golden-rule outcome (P,6"). Starting with h6 [0,6"^), as initial
conditions in any period t ^ 1, the unique solution to these state equations is a Pareto
inefficient Tirole equilibrium path for (fc(, bt) over periods t > r which converges to {k, 0).
As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, every Brokered Economy equilibrium path for (kt, bt)
must solve the state equations (26) and (27). However, as established inTheorem 3, only the
Pareto efficient solution paths for these state equations are tenable equilibrium outcomes for
the Brokered Economy. The proof of Corollary 1 then follows immediately once it is recalled
that bt = BtjLu where Lt = [I + nYLo denotes the number of agents born in period t for
exogenously given values n > 0 and Lq > 0. •
Proof of Corollary 2. Let Rt denote the product of the interest factors [1 + rj] for periods
j = 1,..., T. The tail term for periods t>T mthe calculation of the fundamental value of
the initial stock share price pg is then given by
(54) Pt
Rt
Pt
1+71
Pt
1 + n
X
X
1 + n
Rt
bp
hT
{<}T' ••9i)^o] X
kr
The price Pq equals its fundamental value if and only if the tail term (54) converges to zero
as T —> oo. However, it follows from previous observations that 6^ must-be positive and
convergent to 6" > 0 along any equilibrium path for the Brokered Economy. Consequently,
the tail term (54) converges to zero if and only if [(gr •••9i)^ol converges to zero as T —> 0.
A similar argument can be used to show for arbitrary period t > 0 that pf equals its
fundamental value if and only if [(^r •••qt+i)bt] converges to zero as T -)• oo. However, since
qt> 0and 6* > 0for all <> 0along any Brokered Economy equilibrium path, [{qT ••-qt+i)bt
converges to zero as T —> oo if and only if {qT •••$i)^o, converges to zero as T —> oo. •
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